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Abstract 
The article evaluates different theories of action in the area of crime research. A narrow 
version of rational choice theory assumes actors to choose in an instrumental, outcome-
oriented way. It hypothesises that individuals weight the costs and benefits of criminal acts 
with subjective probabilities. In contrast, a wide version of the theory allows individuals to 
derive utility directly from choosing certain actions. Previous studies either do not directly 
test these theories or yield inconsistent results. We show that a meaningful test of these rival 
rational choice explanations can only be conducted if a broader view is adopted that takes 
into account the interplay of moral norms and instrumental incentives. Such a view can be 
derived from the Model of Frame Selection (Kroneberg 2005) and the Situational Action 
Theory of Crime Causation (Wikström 2004). Based on these theories, we analyze the 
willingness to engage in shoplifting and tax fraud in a sample of 2,130 adults from Dresden, 
Germany. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that only respondents who do not 
feel bound by moral norms consider instrumental incentives. Where norms have been 
strongly internalised and in the absence of neutralisation techniques which legitimise norm-
breaking, instrumental incentives are irrelevant. 
 
___________ 
* The authors would like to thank Rolf Becker, Stefanie Eifler, Hartmut Esser, Franziska Kunz, and Per-Olof 
Wikström who provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The survey on which this research is 
based was financed by the German Science Foundation (DFG) whose generous support is greatly appreciated.
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On shoplifting and tax fraud: 
An action-theoretic analysis of crime 
 
Introduction 
The need to provide micro-foundations for sociological explanations is meanwhile widely 
acknowledged (Blossfeld and Prein 1998; Coleman 1990; Goldthorpe 1996; Lenski 1988). If 
we want to unravel the mechanisms that produce social phenomena, we first have to 
understand what moves individuals and how the social context affects their actions and 
interactions (Hedström 2005). However, it is still unclear which theory of action sociologists 
should use, and how to proceed empirically when testing the resulting explanations. 
In this article, we confront these major questions theoretically as well as empirically, while 
focusing on the explanation of crime. Here, the call for using an explicit theory of action has 
been loudest, since “[t]o explain acts of crime we ultimately need to explain what moves 
individuals to break moral rules defined in law” (Wikström 2006: 69; see also Laub and 
Sampson 2003; Bottoms 2006). 
Our starting points are rational choice theories of crime. These oppose the view that 
offenders are passive victims of social conditions (as in Merton 1968) or are mainly driven by 
psychological traits such as low self-control (as in Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Rather, 
actors are seen to commit crimes as an attempt to maximise physical well-being or social 
advantages (Becker 1968; Cornish and Clarke 1987). We discuss and derive hypotheses from 
two versions of rational choice theory (RCT): A narrow version, which assumes individuals 
to act in an instrumental, outcome-oriented way, and a wide version, which allows actors to 
derive (dis)utility directly from choosing a certain action (for a similar distinction, see Opp 
1999). 
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We argue that a meaningful test of these rival rational choice explanations can only be 
conducted if a broader view is adopted that identifies the subgroup of actors who really 
engage in a cost-benefit calculus. Such a view can be derived from the Model of Frame 
Selection (Kroneberg 2005) and the Situational Action Theory of Crime Causation (Wikström 
2004). According to these theories, actors who feel bound by moral norms against an offence 
do not perceive of it as an option. More specifically, the Model of Frame Selection 
hypothesises that actors unconditionally adhere to moral norms if these have been strongly 
internalised and if the situation cannot be framed in a way that legitimises norm-breaking. 
Only if these conditions do not hold, do actors deliberate over legal and illegal alternatives 
and consider their expected costs and benefits. 
Using survey data from 2,130 citizens in Dresden, Germany, we test several hypotheses 
derived from these theories. We focus on the willingness to engage in shoplifting and tax 
fraud, since these two offences allow us to study more fully the interplay of instrumental 
incentives and moral norms. Our analyses reveal patterns of statistical interaction that confirm 
our theoretical expectations: Respondents with strongly internalised norms disregard 
instrumental incentives to shoplift. In the case of tax fraud, an additional requirement is that 
they not have developed neutralisation techniques which might legitimise norm-breaking. At 
the same time, we are able to show that some respondents do weight the benefits or costs of 
criminal acts with subjective probabilities that the corresponding outcomes will occur. 
However, this key hypothesis of the narrow version of RCT can only be supported by 
focusing on respondents who do not feel bound by strongly internalised norms. This carries 
the important methodological lesson that our evaluation of different rational choice 
explanations depends on taking a more general point of view that recognises the heterogeneity 
of social action. 
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Rational Choice Theories of Criminal Behaviour 
The Classical Theory of Crime by Becker (1968) and Its Extension 
Gary S. Becker considers criminal action to be mainly a problem of maximizing utility 
under the risk of conviction and punishment. He posits that a (sane) person will commit a 
crime if the expected utility exceeds the utility that could be realised through alternative 
(legal) activities (Becker 1968). More specifically, actors are assumed to consider the benefits 
(B) from the offence, the probability of being caught and arrested (p), as well as the costs (C) 
that go with the expected penalty. Hence, the expected utility (EU) of the offence S can be 
defined as follows (Becker 1968, footnote 17): 
EU[S] = B – p⋅C (1) 
Referring to this expression, a crime is more likely to be committed if the expected utility 
exceeds the costs expected to result from detection and penalisation: B > p⋅C. Note that the 
costs associated with a penalty (C) are weighted with the subjectively expected probability of 
being convicted (p). The reason is that an instrumentally rational actor will be deterred from 
the severity of a penalty only to the extent that she expects this outcome to occur (Dahlbäck 
2003: 39; Robinson and Rengert 2006: 23). 
However, the same argument can be made for the potential benefits of an offence. These 
likewise are by no means certain and therefore have to be weighted by a corresponding 
probability. This is the subjective probability (q) of realising the potential benefits of the 
criminal act (Becker and Mehlkop 2006: 198-201; Niggli 1994: 88). Extending equation 1 
accordingly and stressing that the variables entering an actor’s decision calculus are subjective 
assessments, one arrives at the following subjectively expected utility (SEU) of the offence S: 
SEU[S] = q⋅B – p⋅C. (2) 
Here, q denotes the expected probability of successfully carrying out the offence. The latter 
is more likely to be committed if q⋅B > p⋅C. 
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This RCT of crime describes criminal action as the result of an outcome-oriented decision-
making process in which actors actively weigh costs and benefits. Accordingly, criminal 
actors differ from law-abiding ones in their evaluations of the same incentives (McCarthy 
2002: 437; Mühlenfeld 1999: 48). These evaluations “are influenced by the characteristics of 
both offences and offenders” (Cornish and Clarke 1987: 935). 
Thus, it becomes possible to link the variation in perceived incentives to factors which are 
of immediate sociological interest. For example, the knowledge and skills necessary to cheat 
on paying income taxes or to steal a car differs systematically between social groups. Such 
differences in (technical) abilities should also lead to different subjective probabilities of 
success (Sutherland and Cressey 1966). The perceived severity of penalties likewise can be 
assumed to vary by socio-economic status. For example, the opportunity costs of detainment 
are much higher for a person who would otherwise generate a high income in legal 
occupation than for an unemployed person. Finally, different social groups possess different 
knowledge of control authorities’ work and success, leading to different expectations to be 
caught and arrested. For example, in the case of tax fraud, members of lower social classes 
might overestimate the probability of being caught (Becker and Mehlkop 2006). 
 
A Wide Rational Choice Theory of Crime that Allows for Norm Internalisation 
A major shortcoming of the traditional economic approaches to the explanation of criminal 
behaviour (Becker 1968; McKenzie and Tullock 1984) is that they fail to consider moral 
norms and the internalisation thereof. Criminal action is by definition “an act of breaking a 
moral rule defined in criminal law” (Wikström 2006: 63). Therefore, any theory of criminal 
action has to address the dimension of morality, apart from the fact that any law-breaking 
behaviour entails formal sanctions: Norms can prevent criminal behaviour because they have 
become internalised (Tyler 1990, 1997; Wikström 2006: 102). 
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In a theory of subjectively expected utility, internalised norms can be incorporated if actors 
are allowed to derive consumption benefits directly out of performing an action (Yee 1997; 
Opp 1999). To put it simply, actors may prefer to act in accordance with their normative 
beliefs. If they do not, this will lead to a guilty conscience or cognitive dissonance (Festinger 
1957); that is, norm violation involves some kind of psychological costs (N) (Danziger and 
Wheeler 1975: 117; Piliavin et al. 1986). The subjectively expected utility of carrying out an 
offence S can be extended accordingly: 
SEU[S] = q⋅B – p⋅C – N. (3) 
This extension of the decision calculus marks the full transition to a so-called wide version 
of RCT that relaxes core assumptions of a more restrictive or narrow version of the theory 
(cf. Yee 1997; Opp 1999). Allowing for internalised norms as a soft incentive obviously 
breaks with the traditional assumption that actors hold preferences that refer only to tangible 
incentives. More than that, it also means abandoning the assumption of purely instrumental, 
or outcome-oriented, behaviour. It is the act itself, rather than its consequences, that leads to 
psychological costs (or benefits). Accordingly, the disutility of norm violation (N) is not 
weighted with a probability term that would refer to external consequences. 
Wide versions of RCT can account for a much wider range of empirical relationships. A 
wide RCT of crime could be retained even if actors were found not to properly weight the 
benefits (B) and costs (C) of an offence with the corresponding probabilities of success (q) or 
of getting caught (p). Just as has been done in other fields, these variables can be reinterpreted 
as sources of non-instrumental utilities or costs (see already Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Katz 
1988). 
To begin with, the subjective probability of getting caught and the perceived severity of the 
penalty could (independently of each other) deter an actor from committing a crime, simply 
due to the fear that they evoke. Likewise, high expectations of success might increase an 
actor’s sense of self-efficacy (Bandura 1997) and thereby push her to commit an offence, even 
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if it is hardly worth it. Finally, perceiving high benefits could motivate an actor to pursue an 
offence simply because it makes her feel excited about it (Matsueda et al. 2006: 102). If these 
interpretations were correct, the four variables would enter equation 3 not in the form of two 
products, but as four independent additive terms. 
Of course, this greater flexibility in accounting for empirical relationships comes at a price. 
A wide RCT of criminal behaviour yields implications which are far less specific than those 
of the narrow version (Bohman 1992; Kelle and Lüdemann 1998). With regard to four main 
rational choice variables (i.e., leaving aside internalised norms), the wide version carries only 
the following general hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (RCT): Criminal acts result from a cost-benefit calculus. Criminal behaviour is 
more likely, the greater the expectation of success and its utility, and the smaller the 
expectation to be caught and the perceived severity of the penalty. 
 
The narrow RCT of criminal behaviour goes beyond this, since it assumes that actors 
behave in an instrumental, outcome-oriented way. Utilities and costs are weighted with their 
probabilities of occurrence. They influence the decision to the extent that an actor regards 
them as likely (Dahlbäck 2003: 39). This implies rather specific hypotheses about patterns of 
statistical interaction: 
 
Hypothesis 1a (Narrow RCT): Within their cost-benefit calculus, actors weight the perceived 
benefits of engaging in a kind of criminal behaviour with the expectation of success (positive 
statistical interaction), and the perceived size of the penalty with the expectation to get caught 
(negative statistical interaction). 
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The wide RCT subscribes only to Hypothesis 1 and therefore regards as empirical the 
question of whether incentives matter instrumentally, or as consumption benefits or costs. 
Furthermore, as has been discussed above, it also allows for internalised norms to influence 
criminal behaviour: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Wide RCT): Internalised norms might exert a direct influence within the cost-
benefit calculus. The more strongly an actor has internalised norms which proscribe certain 
criminal acts, the less likely she will be to engage in criminal behaviour. 
 
Faced with these different rational choice theories of crime, one could simply leave it to 
empirical analyses and testing to adjudicate between them. And indeed, the kind of 
preferences actors have is now widely regarded as an empirical issue (Kelle and Lüdemann 
1998; Opp 1999). 
Although strongly indicated by theoretical considerations (Nagel 1986), only few studies 
(Grasmick and Bryjak 1980; Grasmick and Green 1981; Paternoster and Iovanni 1986) test 
for the interaction effects hypothesised by narrow RCT (cf. Hypothesis 1a). While Grasmick 
and colleagues find significant and negative interactions between the certainty of punishment 
and the severity of the sanction, Paternoster and Iovanni (1986) do not. However, neither 
study includes the expected benefits from a crime. Becker and Mehlkop (2006), as well as 
Diekmann (1980: 108-109) and Paternoster and Simpson (1996), do not directly test for 
interaction effects, since their regression models include product terms (p⋅C, as well as q⋅B) 
but not the corresponding lower-order terms. The vast majority of empirical studies test only 
for independent additive effects. Most of them find that the severity of the penalty is either 
insignificant or much less important than the expectation to get caught and punished (Entorf 
and Spengler 2005: 331; Elffers et al. 2003: 426-429; Grasmick and Bursik 1990: 840; Nagin 
and Pogarsky 2001: 878; Niggli 1994: 92-93; Silberman 1976: 443; Spengler 2006: 55-61). 
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However, Klepper and Nagin (1989: 741), as well as Bodman and Maultby (1997), find that 
both the certainty and the severity of sanctions are deterrents, while in the study by 
Cummings et al. (2005) the significance of both variables depends on other control variables. 
Thus, quantitative analyses so far fail to provide consistent support for the view that 
criminal behaviour is based on instrumentally rational decisions. To a significant extent, this 
might be due to a major methodological challenge that the strategy to empirically test 
different versions of RCT faces. As we will argue below, it is only a subgroup of actors that 
weighs the costs and benefits of illegal options. In order to conduct a meaningful test of 
rational choice explanations, one has to identify this subgroup theoretically and empirically. 
We do this based on a view that recognises actors’ variable rationality and the significance of 
normative framing, and that thereby points to the limitations of even the wide version of RCT. 
 
 
The Variable Rationality and Normative Framing of Criminal Behaviour 
RCT focuses on how individuals choose among a set of alternatives by comparing their 
respective costs and benefits. In contrast, one can argue that most people simply do not 
perceive crime as an option. This shifts the focus to the question of why actors perceive 
certain alternatives of action, while ignoring others (Becker et al. 2007: 245; Wikström 2006: 
81). 
The theoretical basis of our argument is the Model of Frame Selection (Esser 2001; 
Kroneberg 2005, 2006), which is a formalised theory of action that seeks to integrate RCT 
with normativist-culturalist approaches. Our argument is also in line with Wikström’s 
Situational Action Theory of Crime Causation (2004, 2006). Both theories assume that cost-
benefit calculus is just one mechanism among others underlying individual behaviour. Often 
actors rather stick to a particular action alternative in an automatic-spontaneous mode of 
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decision-making, leaving aside other alternatives and incentives. In other words, actors are 
assumed to exhibit variable rationality depending on attributes of the individual and the 
situation. 
The Model of Frame Selection specifies the conditions under which a reflecting-
calculating mode prevails and those under which actors behave spontaneously (cf. Kroneberg 
2005, 2006). Given our analytical interest and data restrictions, we concentrate on an actor’s 
attitudes towards moral norms and the strength of their internalisation and activation. 
According to the Model of Frame Selection, internalised norms are not always open to trade-
offs against the benefits of successfully breaking the law. Rather, illegal alternatives are 
excluded from consideration if norms have been strongly internalised and are activated 
through a normative framing of the situation. Actors then adhere to moral norms 
unconditionally. In contrast, actors who do not feel bound by moral norms do perceive crime 
as an option. It is only they who consider the respective expected costs and benefits of legal 
and illegal alternatives. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (Model of Frame Selection): Internalised norms can lead actors to disregard 
instrumental incentives to perform a criminal act. The more strongly such norms have been 
internalised, the smaller the effects of instrumental incentives will be. In case of very strong 
internalisation, actors will follow the norm spontaneously without considering instrumental 
incentives. In turn, only within the subgroup of actors with relatively weak internalisation, do 
criminal acts result from a cost-benefit calculus. 
 
Several studies have already relied on intuitions that are similar to this hypothesis. 
However, a first group of studies fails to provide a direct test, because they merely compare 
the explanatory power of incentives in sub-samples of respondents with high morality and 
low morality, respectively (Bachman et al. 1992: 363; Fetchenhauer 1998: 365-366; 
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Paternoster and Simpson 1996). Such sub-sample analyses cannot establish the presence of 
statistical interactions in the full sample. 
A second group of studies does test for interaction effects but suffers from other 
shortcomings and produces mixed results. In support of Hypothesis 3, Burkett and Ward 
(1993) find negative interactions between moral beliefs and the certainty of punishment with 
regard to marijuana-use in a sample of high-school students. Besides the high selectivity of 
such a sample, their regressions fail to control for any other variables. Wenzel (2004) reports 
a negative interaction effect between internalised personal norms and deterrence for tax fraud. 
His results should be interpreted with caution because respondents’ current perceptions of 
deterrence variables are used to explain self-reported prior tax fraud (Wenzel 2004: 564). In 
contrast to Hypothesis 3, Grasmick and Green (1981), as well as Green (1991), find statistical 
interactions between moral commitments and incentives to be insignificant. However, their 
analyses are likely to have insufficient test power due to the small number of observations 
(N = 390 and N = 234, respectively). 
 
A major theoretical as well as empirical shortcoming of these studies is that they fail to 
consider an important aspect of moral commitment (with the exception of Paternoster and 
Simpson 1996: 577). According to the Model of Frame Selection, the power of moral norms 
to suppress incentives also depends on the framing of the situation: Actors can frame a 
situation in ways that make an illegal act look acceptable, or even legitimate (Sykes 1978: 
308). Such a reframing can weaken the activation of a moral norm even if it has been strongly 
internalised. 
In the literature on criminal behaviour, this is referred to as neutralisations. Actors who 
generally support a moral norm can use these techniques to justify their breaking of it 
(Cressey 1971: 93) and to disclaim moral responsibility (Sykes 1978: 307). Thus, the 
relationships described in Hypothesis 3 depend on a normative framing of the situation that 
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makes the actor feel obliged to follow the moral norm (Cressey 1971: 95; Sykes 1978: 310). 
This yields a fourth hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4 (Model of Frame Selection): In exerting their moderating effects, norms depend 
on the existence of a corresponding definition of the situation. If an actor has developed 
neutralisations for breaking a norm, she will not feel obliged to follow the norm, and 
instrumental incentives will regain importance. 
 
Acknowledging the relevance of neutralisations does not mean adopting the cynical view 
that actors can, at will, develop their own neutralisations, making them effectively free to 
choose whatever serves their interest (Coleman 1985: 210). Rather, actors who have strongly 
internalised moral norms are in need of good reasons before they will consider breaking them 
and perhaps even do so. Therefore, neutralisations can be expected to be effective to the 
extent that they refer to generally accepted principles and that they are embedded into a 
legitimising social discourse. 
In our empirical analyses of shoplifting and tax fraud in Germany, we assume that 
neutralisations undermine the binding character of norms especially in the case of tax fraud, 
but generally much less so in the case of shoplifting. The reason being that shoplifting is 
rather uncommon among middle-class adults and is viewed by the general public as clearly 
illegitimate. In contrast, in present-day Germany minor forms of tax fraud, as well as 
insurance fraud, are widely regarded as a peccadillo and even referred to as “sport for the 
masses” (Fetchenhauer 1998: 17). A common argument used to legitimise tax fraud 
exemplifies a more general class of neutralisations: It is argued that the way in which a 
principally supported moral norm (here: to contribute one’s share to the public good) is put 
into law leads to a situation of injustice (Coleman 1985: 208). Thus, if an actor thinks that the 
current system of income redistribution through taxes leaves her with less than she feels she 
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actually deserves, breaking the law can be reframed as a legitimate compensation for work 
performed. 
 
 
Data and Variables 
The following analyses rely on survey data collected between November 2005 and January 
2006 in Dresden, Germany. A total of 3,500 citizens (aged 18 years and older) were randomly 
chosen by the Bureau of Statistics of the city of Dresden and received the questionnaire. After 
one reminder, 2,130 questionnaires were returned, producing an adjusted response rate of 
64% (for further details about the present study see Becker et al. 2007; Mehlkop and Becker 
2007). 
The questionnaire contained 74 questions concerning respondents’ victimisation, as well as 
their own willingness to engage in particular offences. Since the study was explicitly designed 
to directly test rational choice theories of crime, most of the questions dealt with perceived 
incentives and expectations. The wordings and operationalisations of the relevant items, as 
well as descriptive statistics, are listed in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Variables, operationalisation and descriptive statistics 
Variable Question wording Categories: Number; labels Descriptive statistics 
Shoplifting 
Dependent variable  “Would you take goods from a shop without paying for them?” 2; “yes” (1), “no” (0) Yes: 55 (2.61%) 
Non-response: 80 (3.76%) 
Perceived benefits 
(B) 
”Please imagine you would have stolen clothes priced at 150 
EUR from a shop. How valuable are these clothes to you?” 
5; from “not valuable at all” (0) to “very valuable” (1) Mean: .274, Sd: .341 
Non-response: 113 (5.31%) 
Expected probability 
of success (q) 
”How likely would it be that you are able to remove the 
electronic anti-theft device from clothes?” 
5; from “very unlikely, almost zero” (0) to “very 
likely” (1) 
Mean: .245, Sd: .259 
Non-response: 53 (2.49%) 
Perceived severity of 
the penalty (C) 
”Please imagine that somebody tries to steal clothes priced at 
150 EUR from a shop. This person gets caught. What sanction 
has to be expected?” 
5; “no real consequences” (0), “small monetary fine”, 
“high monetary fine”, “probation”, “not quite sure, 
but severe punishment” (1) 
Mean: .274, Sd: .341 
Non-response: 113 (5.31%) 
Expected probability 
of detection (p) 
“Now envisage that you would try to steal something from a 
shop. How likely would it be that you will get caught?” 
5; from “very unlikely, almost zero” (0) to “very 
likely” (1) 
Mean: .744, Sd: .234 
Non-response: 53 (2.49%) 
Normative attitudes 
(N) 
“It is a bad thing to steal goods worth 5 EUR from a large 
department store” 
“It is a bad thing to steal goods worth 50 EUR from a small 
shop”1 
5; from “I totally disagree” (0) to “I totally agree” (1) Mean: .889, Sd: .248 
Non-response: 46 (2.16%) 
Cronbach´s alpha1: .8572 
Tax fraud 
Dependent variable “Please think about your tax return. Would you give false 
information on the tax form to reduce your tax burden?” 
2; “yes” (1), “no” (0) Yes: 269 (13.23%) 
Non-response: 97 (4.55%) 
Perceived benefits 
(B) 
The respondents were asked to estimate the amount of money 
that could be obtained by tax fraud 
5; “never thought about it / nothing” (0), “almost 
nothing”, “one month’s income”, “2-4 months’ 
income”, “as much as my annual income” (1) 
Mean: .157, Sd: .184 
Non-response: 128 (6.01%) 
Expected probability 
of success (q) 
“Do you think that your false information on the tax form could 
pass a test by the tax authorities?” 
5; from “very unlikely, almost zero” (0) to “very 
likely” (1) 
Mean: .311, Sd: .267 
Non-response: 111 (5.21%) 
Perceived severity of 
the penalty (C) 
“Somebody gives false information on a tax form and gets a 
refund of 25,000 EUR. She is detected. What sanction has to be 
expected?” 
5; “just a pay-back, no other consequences” (0), “low 
monetary fine”, “high monetary fine”, “prison”, “not 
quite sure, but severe punishment” (1) 
Mean: .622, Sd: .289 
Non-response: 61 (2.86%) 
Expected probability 
of detection (p) 
“Do you think that the tax authorities discover false tax forms?” 5; from “very unlikely, almost zero” (0) to “very 
likely” (1) 
Mean: .634, Sd: .246 
Non-response: 101 (4.74%) 
Normative attitudes 
(N) 
“Anybody who does not pay his taxes correctly harms society.” 
“Everybody has to make a contribution to society.”1 
5; from “I totally disagree” (0) to “I totally agree” (1) Mean: .884, Sd: .165 
Non-response: 87 (4.09%) 
Cronbach´s alpha1: .6372 
Neutralisation “I got the feeling that I receive less than I actually deserve.” 5; from “I totally disagree” (0) to “I totally agree” (1) Mean: .515, Sd: .331 
Non-response: 27 (1.27%) 
1 The two indicators have been transformed into an index. 
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As dependent variables, we use self-reports on whether or not respondents would be 
willing to shoplift or commit tax fraud, respectively. Hence, we focus on the willingness (or 
propensity) to commit particular offences in the future. Where longitudinal data are not 
available, we deem this to be the overall best strategy to test different theories of action: 
These theories focus on the decision-making process prior to the choice of a criminal action. 
Focusing on present perceptions and the willingness to engage in prospective actions assures 
that the subjective determinants of this process are measured as validly as possible. If, instead, 
past offences of the respondents were analysed, it would become necessary to gather actors’ 
perceptions of past situations retrospectively (i.e., estimated benefits, perceived severity of 
sanction, expectations, etc.). Given that these criminal actions were sometimes committed 
years ago, it is doubtful whether respondents would be able to accurately recall these 
subjective assessments. 
Still, a disadvantage of our strategy is that respondents’ reported willingness to commit an 
offence might not finally materialise. Whether or not it leads to corresponding offences 
depends, among other things, on individuals’ differential exposure to environmental 
inducements (Wikström 2006). Notwithstanding this limitation, recent experiments by 
Pogarsky (2004) demonstrate that criminal intentions are indeed significantly correlated with 
subsequent criminal actions. 
Another potential problem is that some respondents might refuse to answer questions about 
their willingness to commit offences, or else lie due to social desirability (Hindelang et al. 
1979). We tried to minimise this problem by guaranteeing anonymity to the respondents. 
Specifically, we used neutral envelopes for sending back the questionnaire and asked no 
questions about personal characteristics other than standard demographic information. In 
general, the absence of interviewers in mail surveys leads to more honest answers, since there 
is less reason to provide socially desired answers (cf., e.g., Schnell et al. 2005). 
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Notwithstanding that, we also tried to empirically assess the extent of social desirability 
bias in our sample. This was done by looking at the effects of a scale constructed out of three 
items taken from the Marlowe-Crowne Index of Social Desirability (cf. Leite 2005). In our 
sample the connection between (high) social desirability and reporting the willingness to 
engage in an offence is rather small (Cramer´s V = -.102 for shoplifting, and -.118 for tax 
fraud). We also found no relationship between this scale and the rate of non-response on these 
items, which is generally about 5 percent. This indicates that the social desirability bias is 
relatively small in our sample. 
In order to test rational choice explanations of criminal behaviour, we use indicators based 
on items that directly asked for perceived benefits, costs, and subjective probabilities of 
success and of detection (cf. Table 1). This was done separately for shoplifting and tax fraud. 
With regard to each of these offences, we also measured respondents’ normative attitudes 
using unweighted additive indices. We interpret these attitudes as the degree to which 
respondents have internalised norms proscribing these offences. Another item asked whether 
the respondent felt she received less than she actually deserved. As has been discussed in the 
theoretical section, we expect this feeling of deprivation to be associated with reframing tax 
fraud as a legitimate compensation for work performed. 
All explanatory variables are metric in scale and have been standardised on a range from 0 
to 1. We did so since we are theoretically interested in maximum average effects and since it 
also allows us to compare the relative size of effects. 
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Results 
The Significance of Instrumental Incentives for Shoplifting and Tax Fraud 
Table 2 presents the results for several rational choice models of shoplifting. The 
specification in Model 1a corresponds to a narrow RCT, which assumes that individuals 
consider instrumental incentives only. Accordingly, the model estimates interaction effects 
between the benefits and the probability of success and between the costs and the probability 
of detection, respectively (see Paternoster and Iovanni 1986). However, both product terms, 
q⋅B and p⋅C, are clearly insignificant, and p⋅C even has an unexpected positive sign. Thus, 
when looking at the whole sample, we find no support for the view that individuals weight the 
benefits of a criminal act with their expectation of success or that they weight the costs of a 
penalty with their expectation to get caught (cf. Hypothesis 1a). 
Model 2a excludes those product terms. The estimates show that shoplifting becomes more 
likely, the higher the expectation of success, the greater the perceived benefits, and the lower 
the expectation to get caught. This is in line with Hypothesis 1. The perceived severity of the 
penalty, however, has no effect on shoplifting. This no-result mirrors findings from other 
studies (cf. Becker and Mehlkop 2006 and the studies cited therein). 
In Model 3a, we further relax the assumptions of the narrow version of RCT by 
introducing internalised norms as an additional independent variable. Its coefficient is 
statistically significant and indicates a strong influence, which clearly supports Hypothesis 2: 
The more actors believe that shoplifting is a bad thing, the less likely they are to be willing to 
commit this offence. Inclusion of this variable, however, does not substantially change the 
effects of the other rational choice variables. 
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Table 2: Determinants of shoplifting: Narrow and wide rational choice models 
(Logit regressions of self-reported willingness to shoplift) 
 Model 1a 
Narrow RCT 
Model 2a 
Wide RCT 
Model 3a 
Wide RCT 
including 
norms 
Model 4a 
Narrow RCT 
on sub-
sample1 
Intercept -3.307*** 
0.000 
-4.234*** 
0.000 
-2.339*** 
0.001 
-1.806 
0.137 
Probability of success (q) 1.706* 
0.049 
2.212*** 
0.000 
2.320*** 
0.000 
0.476 
0.736 
Benefits of offence (B) 1.256! 
0.069 
1.694*** 
0.000 
1.723*** 
0.000 
0.236 
0.843 
Probability of detection (p) -2.566* 
0.014 
-1.388* 
0.036 
-1.330* 
0.040 
-2.158 
0.180 
Severity of penalty (C) -2.163 
0.276 
0.346 
0.628 
0.209 
0.765 
-0.986 
0.746 
q⋅B 1.076 
0.411 
  4.797! 
0.075 
p⋅C 3.833 
0.153 
  1.976 
0.645 
Normative attitudes (N)   -2.480*** 
0.000 
 
Pseudo R2 0.1339 0.1282 0.1955 0.2375 
Number of cases 1,912 1,912 1,912 226 
1 The sub-sample includes only respondents with weak normative attitudes. 
First entry: logit-coefficient, second entry: p-value. !/*/**/*** p ≤ 0.1/0.05/0.01/0.001, two-tailed test 
 
So far, our analyses would lead to the conclusion that the wide version of RCT is 
empirically more successful at explaining shoplifting than the narrow version, which assumes 
instrumental rationality only. More specifically, internalised norms seem to matter, and 
individuals seem not to weight costs and benefits with their corresponding expectations (as 
indicated by the absence of interaction effects). However, this result could also be misleading. 
Based on the Model of Frame Selection, one would predict that only a subgroup of actors 
considers the instrumental incentives with regard to shoplifting – namely those who do not 
feel bound by strongly internalised norms that proscribe this behaviour. 
This possibility is addressed in Model 4a, which tests the same specification as Model 1, 
but only for the sub-sample of those respondents who either disagree that shoplifting is bad or 
are indifferent in this respect. As can be seen from Model 4a, among those respondents the 
predicted interaction effect between the subjective probability of success and the perceived 
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benefits of shoplifting is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The positive effect of 
the perceived benefits of shoplifting is stronger, the greater the expectation of success (and 
vice versa). Also conforming to theoretical expectations, the conditional effects in Table 2 
show that neither variable has any effect if the other one takes its minimal value of zero (cf. 
Dahlbäck 2003; Matsueda et al. 2006). However, we again do not find the expected 
interaction between costs and the expectation to get caught. This seems to result from the 
irrelevance of the perceived severity of the penalty already apparent in the earlier models and 
previous studies. 
Although these results are in line with the explanation offered by the Model of Frame 
Selection, Model 4a does not provide a direct test of the hypothesised interaction effect 
between instrumental incentives and norm internalisation. Before we approach this task, we 
report results for tax fraud. 
 
Table 3: Determinants of tax fraud: Narrow and wide rational choice models 
(Logit regressions of self-reported willingness to commit tax fraud) 
 Model 1b 
Narrow RCT 
Model 2b 
Wide RCT 
Model 3b 
Wide RCT 
including norms 
Model 4b 
Narrow RCT 
on sub-sample1 
Intercept -0.296 
0.538 
-0.335 
0.289 
1.615 
0.001 
0.373 
0.799 
Probability of success (q) 2.342*** 
0.000 
2.055*** 
0.000 
2.025*** 
0.000 
2.090 
0.153 
Benefits of offence (B) 3.592*** 
0.000 
3.107*** 
0.000 
3.072*** 
0.000 
1.637 
0.488 
Probability of detection (p) -4.947*** 
0.000 
-4.656*** 
0.000 
-4.565*** 
0.000 
-3.889 
0.144 
Severity of penalty (C) -1.156! 
0.076 
-0.904** 
0.002 
-0.910** 
0.002 
1.025 
0.655 
q⋅B -1.163 
0.434 
  1.404 
0.770 
p⋅C 0.553 
0.663 
  -2.881 
0.528 
Normative attitudes (N)   -2.279*** 
0.000 
 
Pseudo R2 0.3075 0.3070 0.3238 0.3328 
Number of cases 1,838 1,838 1,838 171 
1 The sub-sample includes only respondents with weak normative attitudes and who do not feel deprived. 
First entry: logit-coefficient, second entry: p-value. !/*/**/*** p ≤ 0.1/0.05/0.01/0.001, two-tailed test 
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The analyses of tax fraud proceed in the same way as the foregoing analyses of shoplifting. 
We therefore comment only briefly on the results (see Table 3). In Model 1b, we again do not 
find the interaction effects predicted by RCT. The respective product terms even show 
unexpected signs. Upon exclusion of the product terms q⋅B and p⋅C, however, the effects of 
the incentive variables become statistically significant and strong (Model 2b). In contrast to 
shoplifting, we find a negative (albeit relatively small) effect of the perceived severity of the 
penalty. 
Model 3b shows that tax fraud becomes less likely, the stronger a respondent’s conviction 
that paying taxes is a moral obligation. So again, analyses of the whole sample seem to 
support a wide version of RCT that does not require individuals to behave in an 
instrumentally rational fashion (rejection of Hypothesis 1a) and allows for internalised norms 
(confirmation of Hypothesis 2). 
As was done with regard to shoplifting, we now reproduce Model 1b for a sub-sample of 
respondents who are particularly likely to perform an instrumental cost-benefit calculus. As 
has been discussed above, the widely held permissive view on tax fraud in present-day 
Germany should make it easier to find neutralisations for this offence. Since norms should 
only be able to suppress the consideration of instrumental benefits in cases where no such 
neutralisations have been developed (cf. Hypothesis 4), we exclude respondents who feel they 
receive less than they deserve. 
Hence, Model 4b includes only those respondents who feel less strongly obliged to pay 
taxes and who do not feel deprived.1 In contrast to Model 1b, both interaction effects 
predicted by narrow RCT here show the expected sign. Moreover, at least the interaction 
between the perceived severity of the penalty and the expectation to get caught is also of 
substantial size. Notwithstanding that, Hypothesis 1a cannot be clearly supported, even in this 
sub-sample, since these effects are statistically not significant. However, the high uncertainty 
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in the estimates is likely to be due to the small number of cases (N = 171) on which it is 
based. 
 
The Interaction between Instrumental Incentives and Normative Attitudes 
The foregoing analyses provide evidence for the hypothesis of instrumental rationality only 
among respondents who do not feel bound by strongly internalised norms. Moreover, it was 
shown that in these sub-samples not all instrumental incentives are equally important in the 
explanation of shoplifting and tax fraud. With regard to shoplifting, an instrumental incentive 
effect could be identified only for perceived benefits and the subjective probability of success 
(q⋅B). The perceived severity of the penalty seems to be completely unimportant. In contrast, 
with regard to tax fraud, the only relevant instrumental incentive is the penalty weighted with 
the expectation to get caught. We deliver a possible explanation of this pattern in the 
concluding section. In the following tests of Hypotheses 3 and 4, we concentrate on those 
instrumental incentives that were found to be of explanatory power. 
The Model of Frame Selection hypothesises that strong normative beliefs can lead actors to 
disregard instrumental incentives. Therefore, according to Hypothesis 3, the effects of the 
latter (q⋅B or p⋅C, respectively) should diminish with increasing internalisation of the norm. 
Statistically, a test of this hypothesis requires estimation of three-way interactions, since 
instrumental incentives already imply two-way interactions (q⋅B and p⋅C respectively). 
For shoplifting, we test for a three-way interaction between the strength of the normative 
attitude proscribing this behaviour and its perceived benefits weighted by the corresponding 
expectation of success (N⋅q⋅B). For tax fraud, normative attitudes should interact with the 
perceived severity of the penalty weighted by the expectation to get caught (N⋅p⋅C). However, 
as demonstrated above, the significance of instrumental incentives for tax fraud is revealed 
only if we simultaneously take into account the role of neutralisations. In the following 
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analysis of tax fraud, we therefore again exclude respondents who are likely to have 
developed neutralisations that undermine the impact of their normative beliefs. According to 
Hypothesis 4, it is only in this subgroup of 699 respondents that we can expect to find the 
interaction between normative attitudes and instrumental incentives. 
 
Table 4: Determinants of shoplifting and tax fraud: Interaction effects between normative 
attitudes and instrumental incentives (Logit regressions of self-reported willingness to commit 
the respective offence) 
 Shoplifting Tax fraud 
on sub-sample1 
Intercept -2.507 
0.008 
-8.751 
0.067 
Probability of success (q) 0.311 
0.875 
2.233*** 
0.000 
Benefits of offence (B) -0.410 
0.803 
2.680*** 
0.000 
Probability of detection (p) -1.310! 
0.060 
8.168 
0.359 
Severity of penalty (C) 0.398 
0.581 
20.367* 
0.016 
q⋅B 9.407* 
0.021 
 
p⋅C  -27.657! 
0.074 
q⋅N 1.373 
0.560 
 
B⋅N 1.737 
0.374 
 
p⋅N  -14.305 
0.158 
C⋅N  -23.182* 
0.015 
Normative attitudes (N) -1.875* 
0.042 
9.019! 
0.093 
Three-way interaction: 
q⋅B⋅N 
-9.807* 
0.040 
 
Three-way interaction: 
p⋅C⋅N 
 30.483! 
0.080 
Pseudo R2 0.2183 0.3520 
Number of cases 1,912 699 
1 The sub-sample includes only respondents who do not feel deprived. 
First entry: logit-coefficient, second entry: p-value. !/*/**/*** p ≤ 0.1/0.05/0.01/0.001, two-tailed test 
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Table 4 presents the results. The three-way interaction (N⋅q⋅B) estimated in the regression 
of shoplifting clearly supports Hypothesis 3. The coefficients of the six lower-order terms 
(q⋅B, N⋅q, N⋅B, N, q, B) can be readily interpreted since each variable is coded from 0 to 1: 
They show the effects of the respective variable(s) for the scenario in which the other 
variable(s) take their empirical minimum (Braumoeller 2004). 
Hence, the coefficient of the product term q⋅B represents the conditional effect of this 
instrumental incentive if norm internalisation is weakest. From Table 4, we see that for this 
subgroup the model implies a strong positive interaction between the perceived benefits of 
shoplifting and the corresponding expectation of success. Thus, for respondents with 
minimum norm internalisation, the instrumental incentive is estimated to have a significant 
impact on shoplifting. In contrast, where normative attitudes are strongest, this instrumental 
incentive ceases to have any effect. This can be seen from the negative coefficient of the 
product term between all three variables, which is of such size that it equalises the positive 
effect of the interaction q⋅B. 
The regression of tax fraud also confirms Hypothesis 3. Even though in this case the three-
way interaction cannot be estimated with the same degree of certainty (p < .10), the sign and 
size of the coefficient clearly demonstrate its expected substantial importance.2 Here, the 
three-way interaction is positive, since the internalised norms counteract the negative 
incentive (p⋅C) to commit tax fraud. 
Note that the model for tax fraud is estimated on the sub-sample of respondents who do not 
feel they receive less than they deserve – thereby focusing on respondents who do not seem to 
possess neutralisations of tax fraud. Since the predicted three-way interaction can be found 
only in this sub-sample, Hypothesis 4 is also confirmed. 
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Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the three-way interactions graphically. In both figures, the effect 
of one incentive variable is depicted as estimated for respondents with empirically minimum 
and maximum strength of normative attitudes, and empirically minimum and maximum 
values of the other incentive variable. In this way, Figure 1 depicts how the effect of the 
perceived benefits of shoplifting depends on the expectation of success and the strength of 
normative attitudes. A strong positive effect occurs only if the expectation of success is high 
and normative attitudes proscribing shoplifting are weak (solid thin line). The three other 
lines correspond to insignificant associations that result either from strong normative attitudes 
(thick lines) or a low expectation of success (dashed thin line). 
 
Figure 1: Effects of perceived benefits of shoplifting on the willingness to commit this 
offence conditional on the expectation of success and the strength of normative attitudes 
(based on estimates from Table 4) 
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In Figure 2, the thin lines depict the effects of the expectation to get caught on tax fraud for 
respondents with weak normative attitudes. For this subgroup, the interaction effect predicted 
by narrow RCT is clearly visible: A strong negative impact exists only if the perceived 
severity of the penalty is also high (solid thin line). When the latter is low (dashed thin line), 
the subjective probability of detection does not have a negative effect (there is only an 
insignificant positive association). In contrast, the thick lines indicate that for respondents 
with strong normative attitudes, the expectation to get caught does not affect shoplifting (the 
remaining small negative associations are statistically insignificant). Thus, these respondents 
do not seem to even consider the instrumental incentive to break their internalised norms. 
 
Figure 2: Effects of the expectation to get caught on the willingness to commit tax fraud 
conditional on the perceived severity of the penalty and the strength of normative attitudes 
(based on estimates from Table 4) 
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Finally, in the case of tax fraud it should be noted that one effect does not confirm any 
theoretical expectations: The perceived severity of the penalty has a strong positive effect if 
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the corresponding expectation to get caught is small and norm internalisation is weak. This is 
indicated by the high value on the y-axis, from which the solid thin line slopes downward in 
Figure 2. It corresponds to the positive coefficient of C in the second model of Table 4. This 
result might be due to unobserved characteristics of respondents with weak norm 
internalisation and the belief that they won’t get caught. In their case, perceiving high 
penalties in the (subjectively unlikely) case of a conviction might be associated with 
perceiving particularly ‘high stakes’, and therefore also high potential benefits of tax fraud. 
This could lead to the positive coefficient of C if our perceived benefits measure misses this 
aspect of their motivation. 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
This article provided an action-theoretic analysis of shoplifting and tax fraud. In a sample 
of 2,130 adults from Dresden, Germany, we tested several hypotheses derived from different 
theories of action. In the explanation of crime, several major components of theories of action 
are of particular causal significance. Depending on the particular offence under study, 
criminal actions can promise high benefits, but may also involve high risks. Moreover, since 
criminal action is “an act of breaking a moral rule defined in criminal law” (Wikström 2006: 
63), the normative dimensions of action are especially visible in this context. Thus, despite 
our specific focus on crime, the main theoretical and methodological insights of our analysis 
may be transferred to other areas of sociological research. These insights concern the 
questions of which theory of action sociologists should use, and how to proceed empirically 
when testing the resulting explanations. 
According to a narrow version of RCT, an offence is based on an instrumental cost-benefit 
calculus. We contrasted this approach with a wide RCT of crime that allows for norm 
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internalisation and abandons the assumption of purely outcome-oriented behaviour. Our 
empirical analyses corroborated the hypothesis that norm internalisation is strongly associated 
with the willingness to shoplift or commit tax fraud. However, a more complex pattern 
emerged with respect to the question of instrumental rationality. 
Narrow rational choice theories carry the specific hypothesis that actors weight the benefits 
and costs of criminal acts with subjective probabilities that the corresponding outcomes will 
occur. The assumption that all respondents in our sample undertake such an instrumental cost-
benefit calculus would have led us to reject this hypothesis: None of the corresponding four 
interaction effects (q⋅B and p⋅C, with respect to shoplifting and tax fraud) was statistically 
significant, and three of them even had unexpected signs. 
However, further analyses revealed that this rejection would have been rash: We did find 
evidence for instrumentally rational considerations based on the assumption that only 
respondents who do not feel bound by strongly internalised norms consider instrumental 
incentives. With respect to shoplifting, respondents without strongly internalised norms 
weight the perceived benefits of the crime with the expectation to realise these benefits. In the 
case of tax fraud, respondents who do not feel bound by norms weight the perceived severity 
of sanctions with the expectation to get caught. 
A main methodological message of our analyses is therefore that straight-forward 
applications of RCT can lead to erroneous conclusions. It was only by adopting a view that 
acknowledges the heterogeneity of social action that we avoided the wrong conclusion that 
instrumental cost-benefit calculus does not matter empirically. Ironically, therefore, we were 
able to retain one of the most bold and interesting hypotheses of RCT by transcending its 
usual arguments. 
Theoretically, we went beyond a conventional rational choice approach by assuming that 
internalised norms are not just ‘soft’ incentives that are traded against instrumental, tangible 
incentives. Rather, normative attitudes can work as a moral filter, deleting normatively 
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proscribed actions from the set of alternatives under consideration. This view was derived 
from the Model of Frame Selection (Kroneberg 2005, 2006) and the Situational Action 
Theory of Crime Causation (Wikström 2004, 2006). Both theories argue that actors who feel 
bound by strongly internalised norms may not perceive crime as an option, and therefore may 
not deliberate on its costs and benefits. In contrast, actors who have not strongly internalised 
these norms choose among legal and illegal alternatives based on their expected costs and 
benefits. 
We assessed these arguments empirically by testing for three-way interactions between 
normative attitudes and instrumental incentives (since the latter already imply two-way 
interactions). In our analyses of both shoplifting and tax fraud, we found a statistical 
interaction of expected strength and sign: Instrumental incentives were taken into account 
only if respondents did not feel bound by strongly internalised norms. The stronger these 
normative attitudes, the smaller were the effects of instrumental incentives on the willingness 
to commit a crime. In the regression of tax fraud this three-way interaction was only 
statistically significant on the 10 percent level. This higher uncertainty in the estimation is 
likely to originate in the smaller number of cases on which it is based. 
Our analyses also revealed some remarkable differences regarding the determinants of 
shoplifting and tax fraud. First, instrumental incentives for shoplifting were irrelevant among 
respondents with strongly internalised moral norms. With respect to tax fraud, an additional 
requirement was that respondents did not feel they received less than they thought they 
deserved. As the Model of Frame Selection led us to expect, the deterrent power of moral 
norms against tax fraud was weakened when such neutralisations were available. 
A second difference between shoplifting and tax fraud concerns the incentives that are 
taken into account in an instrumental cost-benefit calculus. For shoplifting, the relevant 
instrumental incentive is the perceived benefits weighted with the subjective probability of 
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success. For tax fraud, it is the perceived severity of the sanctions weighted with the 
expectation to get caught. 
A possible explanation of this difference goes as follows: With regard to shoplifting, the 
perceived severity of the penalty was found to be completely unimportant. This may be so 
because the punishment is generally perceived to be rather mild and therefore negligible. 
Nevertheless, we observe only a very low willingness to shoplift. It therefore seems that, for 
most of our respondents, what can be gained through shoplifting is simply too small to be 
worth any risk. This, in turn, implies that perceiving high benefits and a high probability of 
success is particularly meaningful in discriminating the relatively small group of potential 
shoplifters from the rest. 
The situation is different with respect to tax fraud. Here, the punishment is widely 
expected to be relatively harsh. Given the widely shared neutralisations of this offence and its 
rather high prevalence in Germany, the extent to which individuals are not deterred by 
possible sanctions becomes crucial. The most differentiating attributes with respect to tax 
fraud are therefore the perceived severity of penalties and the subjective probability to be 
caught. This could explain why, for this offence, we find an instrumental incentive effect only 
between these variables. 
However, one has to keep in mind that our analyses focused on the willingness to engage 
in shoplifting and tax fraud. Future research should collect longitudinal data in order to focus 
on actual behaviour, while still measuring perceptions and attitudes antedating the offence. 
Besides this need of further testing, it is of the greatest sociological interest to use action-
theoretic arguments as a basis for understanding the significance of systemic factors (Bunge 
2006: 9-10). Knowledge of the causal interplay between the individual determinants of crime 
is crucial to “fully understand the important (but indirect) role of systemic factors (e.g., 
inequality, segregation, and social and moral norms) and their changes over time in crime 
causation.” (Wikström 2006: 62). 
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In this context, our theoretical perspective implies that systemic factors affect different 
individuals in different ways. Factors that merely shape the expected costs and benefits of 
certain crimes should affect only those individuals who really take into account instrumental 
incentives. Individuals with strong normative attitudes can be expected to be insensitive 
towards this opportunity structure, at least in the short term. However, we do not treat the 
members of the latter group as cultural dopes who passively follow rules. Rather, they engage 
in an active framing of the situation, which can lead them to call into question the legitimacy 
and applicability of norms. Thus, the social contexts and processes that shape normative 
attitudes and neutralisations are of great importance (Wikström 2006: 104) and should be a 
target of future research. In our view, such research should be based on an action-theoretic 
view that considers the normative framing of the situation and actors’ variable rationality – 
since it is only for some actors that “opportunity makes the thief”. 
 
 
Notes
                                                 
1 Additional analyses (not reported because of space limitations) show that instrumental incentives do not affect 
tax fraud in the way predicted by narrow RCT if we instead define this sub-sample solely by means of low norm 
internalisation. 
2 However, the very high coefficients in this final regression of tax fraud to some extent also reflect uncertainty 
in these particular estimates. As stated above, due to our coding, the presented coefficients refer to minimum-
maximum comparisons which are of particular theoretical interest. However, observations with such extreme 
combinations easily become sparse, and the high estimates in this final model of tax fraud partly reflect this lack 
of data points. Specifically, there are few respondents who have only weak normative attitudes against tax fraud 
but do not feel deprived. We assured that the high estimates are not due to other statistical problems by re-
estimating both models in Table 4 with z-standardised predictors. This resulted in coefficients of reasonable and 
very similar size across both models (e.g., a change in the three-way interaction p⋅C⋅N by one standard deviation 
is estimated to increase the odds for tax fraud by a factor of 1.43). Analyses are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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